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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 990470-CA 
vs. : 
Priority No. 2 
DANIEL CRUZ PEREZ, : 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
In addition to the facts and arguments contained in the State's opening brief, the 
State submits the following points in reply to the statements and arguments contained in 
defendant's responsive brief. 
THE STATUTORY PHRASE "OTHERWISE DAMAGES" IS NOT 
AMBIGUOUS, AND INCLUDES DEFENDANT'S ACTIONS AS 
ALLEGED 
In his brief, defendant does not dispute that the State produced evidence at the 
preliminary hearing that he caused damage to a jail by scratching an obscenity into a 
cell dooi 1 >cfenilant aipues only that the damaging jails statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-418 (1999), must be narrowly construed to apply only to damage which meets some 
unspecified degree of seriousness. 
The statute punishes anyone who "breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or 
otherwise damages" a jail. In order to argue that the statute does not apply to his 
actions, defendant must show that the phrase "otherwise damages" is so inherently 
ambiguous that the court must consider the other acts listed in the statute in order to 
determine its meaning. This argument fails for several reasons. 
First, this Court has already rejected it. In State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah 
App. 1993), the court held that the damaging jails statute is unambiguous and broadly 
prohibits all physical damage of whatever degree. "The statute sets the standard that 
any injury to a physical facility used for jail functions can be punished under the 
statute." Id. at 466. The amendment of the statute from the phrase "otherwise 
destroys or injures" in the former statute to the current phrase, "otherwise damages" 
only serves to make the broad scope of the statute more clear. 
Second, defendant's argument is based on a false comparison to sex crimes. In 
support of his ambiguity argument, defendant compares the language of this statute to 
the inherently ambiguous terms used to describe sex offenses. Brief of Appellee, p. 5-
6. Defendant asserts that the phrase "otherwise damages" in § 76-8-418 is comparable 
to the term "otherwise takes indecent liberties," in § 76-5-404 (1999), as discussed by 
the court in State ex rel J.L.S., 610 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1980). In fact, these phrases are 
in no way comparable. As defendant acknowledges in his brief, the phrase "otherwise 
damages" is a "broad-yet plain" term. Brief of Appellee, p. 5. On the other hand, the 
2 
phrase "indecent liberties" is necessarily vague, a difficulty arising out of the special 
problems inherent in drafting statutes prohibiting sexual abuse: 
These questions are, in a basic sense, manifestations of a recurring 
problem in construing statutes, particularly those prohibiting sex crimes: 
On the one hand, there is the need to give effect to the legislative intent 
and penalize sexual abuse, a concept which, in all its possible forms, is 
extremely difficult to define. On the other hand, there is a need to define 
the prohibited conduct with precision in order to avoid unconstitutional 
vagueness and chilling of protected conduct, and to avoid attaching the 
weight of criminal culpability to innocent or innocuous (but possibly 
indecorous) behavior. 
Utah courts have addressed this problem by interpreting the broad, 
catch-all phrases of sex crime statutes (phrases such as "taking indecent 
liberties") in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the case. 
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah App. 1990). In State ex rel J.L.S., the court 
found that the phrase "indecent liberties" is so inherently ambiguous that the statute 
would be void-for-vagueness unless it is given meaning and limited in scope by the 
more specific acts listed. Id., 610 P.2d at 1296. See also State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 
458 (Utah App. 1991) ("'the phrase "act of gross lewdness" is not subject to a plain 
meaning, but must derive its definition from the context in which it occurs.'") {quoting 
State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994 (Utah App. 1989)). 
In this case, defendant has not asserted that the scope of the phrase "otherwise 
damages" must be limited in order to prevent the statute from being unconstitutionally 
vague, and a void-for-vagueness argument against the damaging jails statute was 
explicitly rejected without any need for limiting its broad scope. Pharris, 846 P.2d at 
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466 ("Defendant's disagreement with the broad interpretation of the statue's language 
does not translate to a lack of meaningful standards to guide the application of the 
statute."). Accordingly, unlike cases interpreting language used to describe sex crimes, 
there is no need for the court to turn to interpretive doctrines such as eusdem generis or 
noscitur a sociis in order to avoid a vagueness problem in this statute. See Id. ("the 
statutory language includes 'any damage to the facility' within the plain meaning of 
'injury'"). 
Finally, defendant acknowledges that this court has adopted a broad definition of 
"injury" or "damage" in interpreting this statute. In the face of this, defendant asserts 
only that the court should must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the statute 
applies to the alleged conduct. Brief of Appellee, p. 7-8. Of course, the application of 
any statute to alleged conduct is determined on a case-by-case basis, in that the facts 
proven at the preliminary hearing are examined by the court to determine whether they 
fulfill all of the elements of the crime alleged. 
In this case, however, defendant is seeking to add an additional element to the 
crime, i.e., that the damage done to the jail meets some unspecified level of 
"substantial" injury or caused some unspecified level of harm to the operation of the 
jail.1 The broad and unambiguous language of the statute precludes the imposition of 
1
 Defendant's formulation of the additional element is even more limited than 
this, and would not justify dismissal of the charges against him in this case. Defendant 
4 
such a requirement, and the courts in Pharris and State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah 
App. 1991), did not require proof of some substantial level of damage. See Pharris, 
846 P.2d at 466 (rejection of defendant's argument that "the statute should be limited to 
felony prosecution of 'substantial' damage"). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, the trial court's quashal of the bindover and dismissal of 
the charge should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _W_ day of February, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
SCOTT KEITH WILSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
asserts that the statute should be construed to require that the State prove that the 
alleged conduct "damages or injures portions of the jail facility that are essential to its 
proper functioning and legislative purpose." Brief of Appellee, p. 8. The cell door 
which defendant damaged is obviously essential to the functioning of a jail. 
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